Thirty thousand men defeated Chiang Kai-shek three hundred thousand. From that day on, no one could defeat MAO Zedong

2022-05-21 0 By

In July 1931, Chiang Kai-shek led 300,000 troops to carry out a third “encircle and suppress” campaign against the central revolutionary base. By September, MAO Zedong’s 30,000 red Army defeated MAO zedong with a complete set of tactics of “defeating the strong with the weak and defeating the many with the few”. From this day on, no one could defeat MAO Zedong any more!MAO Zedong in the Red Army Period (oil painting) At the end of 1930, MAO Zedong led the Red Army to two consecutive victories in five days with the tactics of “luring the enemy deep”, breaking Chiang Kai-shek’s first “encirement and suppression” of the base areas.Chiang Kai-shek felt little bitterness over the failure of his first “encirclement and suppression” campaign.The victory gave MAO an important “gift” — radio, which added wings to a tiger’s red Army, like a pair of wind-friendly ears to the mighty Sage.After Chiang kai-shek’s defeat, MAO Zedong began to attack the county towns, and the victory in the counter-campaign naturally brought high morale. The Red Army quickly occupied ruijin and other counties, destroyed many landlords and gentry forces, expanded the base areas, and developed the local forces rapidly.By attacking local tyrants and dividing up land, the Red Army increased its supplies and funds considerably.Chiang felt careless after his defeat, but it did not hurt him too much because he had guns and men, and on April 1, 1931, he launched a second “encirclement and Suppression” campaign.This time Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 200,000 people led by He Yingqin, not destroy the Red Army he vowed not to give up.In his first “encirclement and suppression” campaign, Chiang kai-shek mobilized 100, 000 men, and the ratio of them to the Red Army was 10 to 4. In this campaign, the ratio of them to the Red Army was 20 to 4, fighting every five men.This time, he would advance only five or ten miles a day, then stop to build fortifications, and let the Returning Corps work with the militia corps to clean up the aftermath. This kind of fighting would depend on how MAO Zedong would deal with it.MAO zedong’s solution was still to “run”, that is to say, walk, which can be described in four words: “When the enemy advances, we retreat.”But the situation in the Red Army had changed: Xiang Ying, a genuine worker who had been interviewed by Stalin and returned from the Soviet Union, became MAO’s superior.But because Xiang Ying did not know much about military command, MAO Zedong still commanded the operations.Subsequently, the central delegation composed of Ren Bishi, Wang Jiaxiang and Gu Zuolin arrived at the central base, as a politburo member ren Bishi status highest.At the meeting, the central delegation basically affirmed MAO zedong’s work. As we all know, superiors only “affirm” the work of subordinates. In other words, the purpose of the central delegation was to remind MAO Zedong, understand, we are your superiors!You have to listen to us!At this time, some of the team stood up and said that they would listen to the central committee, because they knew that the central delegation had a higher status than MAO Zedong.Although xiang Ying did not know how to fight, he, on the instructions of the central government, advocated that the Red Army should move out of the base areas, while others advocated that they should split up and retreat.In the first counter-campaign against “encirclement and Suppression” MAO Zedong opposed these two erroneous propositions. We can look at MAO’s propositions from the perspective of “hindsight”. MAO zedong was indeed brilliant, but at that time, apart from Zhu De and Tan Zhenlin, many others were neither able to think of nor willing to accept MAO’s propositions.Under such circumstances, MAO Zedong did not argue with the central delegation, but proposed to Ren Bishi to expand the scope of the meeting to discuss the matter, Ren Bishi agreed.Many people at the grass-roots level had fought with MAO zedong for years and most of them supported his methods of war.Thus, the minority of people who accepted MAO’s ideas became the majority.The next discussion was which part of the enemy should be attacked first. MAO zedong argued that the weak enemy’s army should be attacked first. After discussion, MAO zedong’s operational policy was adopted.Ren Bishi and MAO Zedong actually have a deep relationship. In 1920, when he was 16 years old, he took part in the revolution under the influence of MAO Zedong. The relationship between MAO Zedong and Ren Bishi is similar to that between teachers and students.Ren Bishi had to carry out the instructions of the central government led by Wang Ming and Bo Gu, so he drafted a document to criticize MAO Zedong’s “narrow empirical theory” for handing over to the central government, but his heart was with MAO Zedong, so he never thought of seizing MAO Zedong’s military power.MAO knew this, so he focused on persuading Wang Jiaxiang, who was in charge of military affairs.MAO Zedong wrote his combat experience in a pair of couplets to Wang Jiaxiang, Wang Jiaxiang looked very admire.MAO Zedong’s couplet reads, “When the enemy advances, we retreat, when the enemy is stationed, we disturb him, when the enemy is exhausted, we pursue him.March forward and retreat, lure the enemy deep, concentrate forces, defeat the enemy one by one, and kill the enemy in mobile warfare “, Wang Jiaxiang turned to support MAO Zedong.Xiang Ying and Gu Zuolin oppose MAO Zedong, ren Bishi does not say whether or not, but in the actual debate, Ren Bishi thinks MAO Zedong “has a unique view, talented”.Therefore, MAO Zedong, who had gained support at the enlarged conference, immediately ordered the elimination of Wang Jinyu’s followers.In order to eliminate Wang Jinyu, MAO Zedong led more than 30,000 red army hidden in the mountainous area has been waiting for the opportunity, many people could not bear, MAO Zedong insisted on waiting, has been waiting for 25 days, Wang Jinyu just came out.This time MAO Zedong directed the Red Army to cleverly penetrate the enemy’s rear.Unprepared, the enemy immediately fell into confusion. Most of Wang Jinyu’s division was wiped out. In pursuit, a brigade of Wang Jinyu’s division was destroyed.Then, MAO Zedong and Zhu De command of the Red Army swept more than 700 li, the enemy killed more than 30,000 people, captured a large number of materials.The Second Counter-Campaign against “Encirclement and Suppression” (Oil painting) Chiang Kai-shek’s second “encirclement and Suppression” again failed.During this period, Chiang Kai-shek put Hu Hanmin under house arrest, and Wang Ching-wei thus found a reason to settle accounts with Chiang Kai-shek.Thus, a keen MAO anticipated that Chiang would have to deal with his rivals in Guangdong and Guangxi first.According to this estimate, MAO scattered the Red Army to collect supplies and money.But MAO was wrong this time, for, much sooner than MAO had expected, Chiang suddenly launched a third “encirclement and suppression” campaign.Chiang kai-shek wanted to deal with the Guangdong warlords, but MAO Zedong’s red army was closer to him, so he simply attacked MAO zedong first and then Wang Ching-wei.This time, Chiang kai-shek mobilized 300, 000 troops to command operations in Kiangsi, and he wanted to fight MAO Zedong on the battlefield.The Red Army scattered around to collect supplies and funds, but the enemy arrived so fast that Although MAO Zedong’s Red Army numbered more than 30,000, it could not be concentrated in such a short time. Therefore, MAO Zedong hurriedly concentrated the main force and ran back to the interior of the base area first.However, MAO zedong found that the enemy was advancing so fast that it was too late for him to retreat to the hinterland of his base area. He had to direct his troops to make a wide circle to avoid the enemy’s offensive edge before concentrating their main forces.This is not easy in a rapidly changing situation.MAO zedong’s approach to the enemy was to “avoid the main force of the enemy and attack its weakness”, but that was no easy task!Even if the enemy is ten times as fast as he is, he can still separate his troops to pursue him.If you run slowly, the enemy will make dumplings directly, which is even worse.The difficulty is that the timing of the run is very difficult.At this time, MAO Zedong was in a very dangerous situation, facing the enemy on three sides and the Gan River on one side.There’s only a 20-kilometer gap to cross.MAO Zedong disguised a small number of troops as the main force, to the direction of the Ganjiang river to attract the enemy, the main force has jumped out of the encircled circle while the night.But the enemy soon attacked again, MAO Zedong asked Tan Zhenlin to continue to lead a small number of troops to the east away from the enemy, the main force secretly westward.This time more thrilling, MAO Zedong from the narrow gap of 10 kilometers through the past, out of the encirclement.Tan Zhenlin set off firecrackers in petrol drums and threw grenades at night, so that all the way over the mountains and mountains, dragging the enemy fat become thin, thin drag death, non-combat personnel reduction as much as one third.At this time, the anti-Chiang Kai-shek allied forces of Guangdong and Guangxi moved northward on a large scale, and Chiang Had to retreat.MAO Zedong led the Red Army to seize this good opportunity to fight back in time, broke the third “encirclement and suppression” of Chiang Kai-shek, in 80 days, annihilated more than 30,000 people, captured more than 12,600 guns.Chiang kai-shek’s 300, 000 army could not defeat MAO zedong’s 30, 000. He had no face to explain.Third Counter-Campaign “Encirclement and Suppression” (oil painting) For the third “encirclement and Suppression”, Chiang Kai-shek had absolute superiority and favorable opportunities.MAO zedong had no outside help and was able to turn a defeat into a victory in a very small space, which meant that from this day on, no one could defeat MAO Zedong!